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Abstract 
The role of a labour pension trustee is significant, which makes the recruitment and 
selection of labour trustees an important issue. In this paper we examine and 
combine aspects of two approaches to recruitment and selection, the political 
nomination model and the more professional HRM approach. The political 
nomination model is often used by trade unions to elect or appoint trustees. In 
contrast, a professional HRM approach emphasizes open recruitment and selection 
based on job-related criteria of expertise and continuous learning.  We argue that an 
integrative approach would acknowledge the political, regulatory and organisational 
context while incorporating valid selection criteria such as domain-specific skills and 
performance on the job. Such an integrated process can help trade unions in filling 
labour trustee positions with talented individuals who are more likely to be effective 
in achieving labour’s goals in pension governance. 
 
 
1 
 
Introduction 
 
A discernible world-wide trend towards giving pension plan members greater say in 
pension governance has emerged in the last half-century. In the context of 
unionized workplaces this has led to more union trustees on pension boards. The 
increasing presence of employee representatives on pension boards has attracted 
some scrutiny of the role and effectiveness of such representatives. Although 
research on this topic is still lacking it has been found that labour (or employee) 
representatives on pension boards may not be fully participative members of the 
board (Reference withheld 2007; Reference Withheld 2011).  
 
The role of trustees on a pension board is challenging at the best of times; shifting 
demographics, turbulent markets, heightened economic pressures on employers and 
plan constituents, and movements in support of alternative investment strategies 
further complicate challenges facing pension trustees. Labour trustees are not often 
experts in pension governance, investment policy, or actuarial science and they must 
acquire a degree of functional competence to operate on the board. Moreover, they 
experience a heightened political environment due to their actual or perceived union 
allegiance. In fulfilling their role, labour trustees must negotiate the tension of their 
fiduciary duty to the plan and its constituents and of representing the values or 
agenda of their own trade union and perhaps the labour movement more broadly. 
Therefore, many trustees experience a degree of both role conflict and role 
ambiguity (Rizzo et al 1970). They experience role conflict between their status as a 
pension trustee and their status as a union member. They experience role ambiguity 
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because there are no clear guidelines as to the responsibilities of pension trustees as 
set by pension boards, plan administrators or regulators.  
 
All of the above make the recruitment and selection of the right candidate fraught 
with problems. This paper examines two alternate approaches to recruitment and 
selection of labour trustees: the nomination approach which is more political in 
nature and the more professional human resource management (HRM) approach. 
The nomination approach emphasizes the overall political goals of the organization, 
in this case the union, and the nominated individuals’ political connections to the 
leadership of the union. In contrast, the HRM approach emphasizes development of 
a job description backed up by formal job analysis, advertizing the job description 
widely to generate a pool of qualified applicants and then a careful selection process 
consisting of validated tests and interviews. To HRM professionals any process that 
circumvents these essential steps would result in large errors in placement. We 
compare and contrast the two alternate approaches to identify the strengths and 
weaknesses of each as it applies to placement of labour trustees. We argue that 
both models have their strengths and shortcomings and that unions would benefit 
from incorporating key elements of the HRM approach into their own nomination 
approach. Rather than establish a new dichotomy from which to advocate a 
particular set of trustee characteristics that are necessary for fund governance and 
performance (i.e., the general prudence versus professionalism debate), we attempt 
to synthesize these poles. We suggest that a blended approach to recruitment and 
selection could result in labour trustees with more skills in both the political and 
professional realms. This would result in greater functional competence, less role 
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ambiguity, and more effective participation on the pension board in pursuing 
labour’s goals.  
 
Labour Trustees on Pension Boards 
 
In Anglo-Saxon contexts, including Canada, Australia, the US and the UK, there is 
some evidence that the composition of pension fund boards have become more 
diverse in terms of affiliation, skills and experiences, including cultural and socio-
demographic aspects (Clark 2007; Rafferty et al 2008,Reference Withheld).  With the 
support of trade unions, diversity has increased through greater numbers of plan 
members and retirees at the board table as pension trustees (Gribben & Olsen 2002; 
Hess 2005; Reference Withheld).  Such diversity is often viewed as an important 
regulatory mechanism within the corporate governance literature (Tyson 2003). 
Diversity and representation can have an enhancing effect on board effectiveness as 
it reduces agency costs through monitoring the management’s inherent conflicts of 
interests with stakeholders (Daily et al. 2003).  As well, Carter et al, (2003: 36) 
report a positive relationship between board diversity and firm value among Fortune 
1000 firms in the US.  
     
In the Anglo-Saxon model, pension trusteeship is an executive decision-making role 
with a high level of legal and moral responsibility (Kakabadse et al 2003). Trustees, 
in general, oversee significantly large financial assets1. They also negotiate with 
                                                          
1 For example, trusteed pension funds in Canada had assets of $997.8 billion in the third 
quarter of 2011 (Statistics Canada 2011). In 2011, Towers Watson, a consulting 
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corporate sponsors over funding of occupational  pension plans that affect the 
pension outcomes of plan members. Moreover, as institutional shareholders, pension 
funds exert a dominant role in global financial markets and are influential in shaping 
global corporate investment policy. Thus the decision-making process at the board 
table also impacts on wider society (Gribben & Grisham 2006).  
 
Given the importance of the trustee role and the diversification of trustees through 
increased representation of plan constituents, a debate has arisen regarding the 
benefits and risks of so-called ‘lay’ trustees and the skills and education that are 
required for trustees to effectively fulfill their fiduciary role. Clark et al. (2006) and 
Ambachtsheer et al. (2008) consider that well-intentioned amateurs can complicate 
and limit decision-making of pension plans. Clark (2007) claims that the tension 
between expertise and representation is increasing as institutions search for 
appointees capable of performing well during periods of turbulent financial markets 
and crises of underfunded liability such as those experienced by Canada, the US and 
the UK over the past decade. Though investment experts also face this uncertainty, 
Woods and Urwin (2010:8) claim that they are better able to test and modify their 
thinking than other naïve investors. Clark (2007:9) argues that representatives 
without advanced quantitative skills, probabilistic reasoning, and numeracy skills are 
less competent to adequately monitor the actions of delegated agents and can 
become in thrall to powerful legal, financial, and investment experts on how to 
behave and act (Clark and Urwin 2010). Evidence cited to support these claims is a 
pension trustee experiment which contrasted Oxford graduates with a self-selected 
                                                                                                                                                                             
firm, estimated pension assets in the U.S. at $16.08 trillion, in the U.K. at $2.394 
trillion and in Canada and Australia at $1.3 trillion (Towers Watson 2012). 
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group of pension trustees (Clark et al 2006). It was found that when it came to 
strategic investment decision-making the graduates were more consistent than the 
pension trustees.  
 
Myners (2001) too was concerned about expertise versus representation. Myners’ 
response was to suggest that the standard of prudence, common law praxis, be 
raised from ‘rational decisions by an ordinary man’ to one where decisions are made 
with ‘the skill and care of someone familiar with the issues concerned’. He 
acknowledged that it would be unrealistic for all trustees to undergo extensive 
training to gain deep expertise, but recommended that trustees should collectively 
improve board expertise. Myners (2001: 21) stated that trustees should “…assess 
the effectiveness of their own contribution to meeting the objectives of the fund”, 
and consider: 
• whether the decision-making structures they have in place 
address the task of effectively running their fund; 
• whether the division of time between their various responsibilities 
is right; 
• whether they have the right mix of skills and experience 
collectively; and 
• whether the fund’s control environment is fit for the purpose  
 
This recommendation illustrates that pension boards are responsible for setting their 
own standards and uniquely defining the trustee’s roles and responsibilities vis-a-vis 
their oversight role. Like Myners, Ambachsheer et al. (2008) also support greater 
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professionalism in trusteeship, but emphasize the importance of the internal capacity 
of the board to set and maintain standards to achieve strong oversight. Reviews of 
corporate board dynamics (Van der Walt et al 2006, Huse 2005) reveal the inter-
relationships of decision-making where coalitions between others can influence the 
decision-making process and board outcomes. Thus, if trustees become too 
entangled in financial and investment detail there is a danger that they descend into 
micro-management, losing oversight of the broader dynamics of the decision-making 
process needed for good pension governance (Ambachtsheer 2007:5).  
 
Ambachtsheer’s more functional approach to pension governance recommended  
clarity about the organisation’s purpose through an examination of the boards’ role 
and accountability to stakeholders, and to set out management’s role in meeting 
board expectations. The trustee has to be able to think strategically, and have skills 
or experience in investments, risk management, strategic planning, audit, and HR. 
Yet, perhaps more fundamental to this, and all principal-agent scenarios, is the 
motivation that trustees are able and willing to use their ‘wisdom, skills and 
experience’ to achieve the organisation’s purpose to deliver the organisation’s 
pension objectives (Ambachtsheer 2007:5). Central to this notion of motivation is 
the sense that the pension trustee is a caretaker of the fund. Boxall and Purcell 
indicate that motivation is a ‘fragile’ concept because it is linked to unpredictable 
interaction between different parties (2011:26) and in governance this includes 
negotiating the different perspectives that stakeholders’ representatives bring to the 
pension plan. However, for Ambachtsheer et al (2008) representation is not enough.  
Expertise is also needed to counter perceived weaknesses in trustees’ oversight to 
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combat potential moral hazard and conflict of interest. Labour trustees are often 
asked to ‘leave their union hat at the door’, but in some cases labour representatives 
could face the risk that the strengths of common law praxis, such as integrity, 
honesty, accountability and independence would be subsumed under the imperatives 
of professional management praxis. This could undermine their participation 
particularly in private pension plans where, according to a member of Quebec’s 
Expert Pension Committee, the board may include ‘management conscripts’ or those 
appointed because of their management role and conciliatory relationship to the 
employer rather than for their knowledge or competence.  Based on our interview 
and survey data, this is a particular danger given the tendency for trustees to 
delegate decision-making power. This delegation occurs to external advisors such as 
fund managers, actuaries, and pension staff, and to pension board sub-committees 
(i.e., investment, audit) where there is a tendency to self-select based on perceived 
or assumed skills. Such a division of labour undermines the oversight capacity of the 
board and has high agency costs.  
 
Leblanc (2004) argued that to understand the black box of corporate governance 
one has to focus on board processes and board members’ behaviour, as well as their 
skills. As Pye and Pettigrew (2005:31) outline, a specific behavioural act ‘gains 
meaning in situations that are located in time.’ In this case, the behavioural 
processes behind a board’s attempts to reach consensus are rooted in the structure, 
culture, and political power dynamics of the particular pension plan arrangement as 
well as the regional, industrial, economic, social and political contexts in which the 
organization and the pension plan operate. In this vein, Kakabadse and Kakabadse 
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(2005) advocate for the motivation, commitment, and contextual embeddedness 
that are often rooted in the experiences of a lay trustee. While they acknowledge 
that there may be an advantage to financial expertise, they conclude that “being 
well qualified and financially well versed are not perceived determinants of effective 
performance for pension fund trustees.” (2005, p. 582) Rather, they emphasize the 
importance of wider life and work experiences: open-mindedness, willingness to 
learn, ability to listen and work with colleagues, and knowing how to access internal 
and independent expertise when needed.  
 
In the face of this debate, Kakabadse and Kakabadse (2005:570) claimed that the 
focus should not be on polarity between prudence and professionalism or expertise 
and representation, but on how HRM involvement could help enhance trustee 
performance and effectiveness through recruitment and selection. Tyson (2003: 9) 
made a similar recommendation for the selection and development of non-executive 
directors. She advocated for standard HRM practices that could be employed to elicit 
a broad pool of applicants for non-executive director roles while simultaneously 
meeting the dual criteria of representation (diversity) and competence.  
   
The present paper addresses this call as it explores the value and implications of a 
HRM-based recruitment and selection approach for union pension trustees in 
addition to the political nomination method. It argues that an integrated approach 
would result in a process that sidesteps the professionalism and prudence debate by 
creating a system that attracts a broader pool of candidates, where the values of 
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both prudence and professionalism can co-exist in a chosen candidate rather than 
favour one over the other.  
 
Methodology 
To reveal the political as well as practical experiences of nomination, appointment 
and election to the labour trustee role, we revisit three sources of previously 
collected data (Reference Withheld, 2007, 2008, Reference Withheld2011;Reference 
Withheld, 2011). Data sources include: semi-structured interviews with fourteen 
policy-makers and experienced pension trustees including six labour trustees in two 
Canadian provinces in 2008; twenty semi-structured interviews conducted in 2004 
with Canadian labour trustees; and a survey of 116 Canadian labour trustees 
conducted in 2005.  
 
We examine this data with a mixed method approach (Brannen, 2005; Tashakkori & 
Teddlie, 2010) that allows us to assess complementary (Greene et al 1989) 
experiences with both the political and human resource management approaches to 
recruitment and selection.  
 
It is important here to note the applicability of research in the Canadian context to 
the legislative, political and economic realities of other Anglo-Saxon countries. The 
Canadian trend toward greater union involvement in pension trusteeship mirror 
those in countries such as the US, UK and Australia, though the specific legislative 
context that allows for member representation may vary somewhat across 
jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions such as the province of Quebec in Canada,  
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legislation stipulates that pension boards have at least one active representative 
from the pension fund constituency and one retiree member. In other provincial 
jurisdictions in Canada, the number of member trustees and their means of 
appointment vary and range from sole labour trusteeship (e.g., in the private sector 
building trades) through joint-trusteeship, with equal number of employer and 
employee seats, to boards with only one labour representative (Reference 
Withheld2007). Similar trends exist in other countries. In the UK one-third of pension 
trustees have to be elected members of the plan, and private sector Taft-Hartley 
plans in the US must have equal numbers of employer and union selected trustees. 
Public occupational pension plans traditionally have more politically nominated 
appointments to boards, this means that this Canadian case study shares resonance 
with US and UK pension contexts where fund governance is organized around the 
conventions of traditional Anglo-Saxon trust model and fiduciary responsibilities 
(Clark 2007:6).  
 
The Political Nomination Approach 
We found an element of political nomination in all cases of labour trustees’ 
recruitment and selection. Generally, labour trustees are recruited by the union. The 
union executive approaches specific individuals or makes general calls to their 
internal staff/executive or the rank and file membership. Following this ‘nomination’ 
potential labour trustees might run for election, be appointed straightaway by the 
union, or be recommended to the employer/government involved in the plan for 
appointment. As such, individual union members become involved in pension 
trusteeship by coming to the attention of their union executive or union staff 
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through self-selection, union activism/involvement in pension matters, or general 
union activism/involvement. In rare cases the union may choose to appoint external 
representatives who tend to be from the financial or business community, or have 
some particular expertise in pension matters (i.e., Teachers’ Pension Plan, Canada 
Post Pension Plan).  
 
One strength of the political nomination approach is its compatibility with the 
process used to fill other union jobs. Through their union activities trustees have 
gained abilities in leadership, consensus building, public speaking, and critical 
analysis that facilitate their effectiveness in representing their constituents on the 
pension board. As Kakabadse and Kakabadse (2005) argue, these are the key 
characteristics of the ‘lay trustee’ that is so central to principles of prudence. Many 
labour trustees also cite the importance of a strong ‘union world view’ or labour 
perspective so that the labour voice in the boardroom is distinguishable. Recruiting 
and selecting candidates based on past union involvement and activism would 
ensure a strong grounding in this regard. This is reinforced given that unions are 
relatively lax in the guidelines they give to their labour trustees (Reference 
Withheld2008) and the covert and overt co-option to traditional governance and 
investment perspectives that occurs at the board and at industry events.  
 
 However, there are several weaknesses in this approach. The competency and 
legitimacy of labour trustees can be, and often is, questioned by important others in 
the pension industry. When regarded as the lay person, labour trustees may be seen 
12 
 
by pension staff, industry fund managers, and other board members as less expert 
(Ambachtsheer et al 2008;).  
 
A second weakness is that a political nomination approach operates within existing 
power structures. In our labour trustee survey, only three percent self-selected (i.e., 
they were not approached by the union). Unions are political actors; recruitment and 
selection models that recreate existing institutional norms and power dynamics are 
problematic. Speaking of similar Anglo-Saxon contexts, Kakabadse and Kakabadse 
(2005) and Kang et al. (2007) claim that a board functions better where there are a 
variety of perspectives and experiences; however, boards also have to consider the 
functional areas of benefits, administration, governance, and investment issues in 
their decision-making. So, although direct evidence is not available, we speculate 
that the nomination approach could exclude people who could be very effective in 
the trustee role. Similarly, it is likely that many nominated individuals who might be 
effective as union leaders may prove to be ineffective in the pension trustee role.  
 
A final weakness is the cycle of a democratic election process where job incumbents 
must stand for re-election at regular intervals. In the political context of a union it is 
important to maintain these democratic principles because the union is the voice of 
the membership and all major decisions are ratified at the grassroots level. In the 
context of pension trusteeship, where the learning curve is steep and the oversight 
requires a long-term perspective, short board tenure is a disadvantage. 
 
The Human Resource Management Approach 
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Open recruitment and selection based on valid criteria are integral to HRM models, 
alongside training and development, performance management and compensation 
(Storey 2007). While there is a debate about the different models of HRM, all stress 
the systematic process of recruitment and selection to ensure strategic or cultural fit 
(Boxall & Purcell 2011, Legge 1995). In this case it means ensuring fit with pension 
board strategy, culture and norms as well as the collective constituency of the 
pension board, which includes employer/employee representatives (Guest 1987).  
 
In HRM models (Figure 1), the recruitment and selection process normally involves 
writing a job advertisement based on the job analysis and job description of the 
vacant position, posting this widely to attract a large pool of applicants, and then 
using validated tests and interviews to identify the best candidate who is then 
offered an adequate compensation package and inducted into the organisation (Cipd 
2009). This HRM model emerges from the accumulation of research evidence and 
practical knowledge over several decades (See Taylor 2010 and Catano et al. 2010 
for a comprehensive description of the HRM recruitment and selection process).  A 
formal job analysis ensures a clear understanding of the knowledge, skills, and 
abilities required in the job. This is communicated to the applicants through an 
accurate job description that also acts to align the role with other jobs within the 
organization. Posting the job description in appropriate places ensures that all 
persons qualified for the job have the opportunity to consider applying. The larger 
the qualified applicant pool, the greater the likelihood that the position can be filled 
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with an excellent employee. Selection using validated tests and interviews also 
enhances the likelihood that the chosen candidate would perform well on the job. 
 
Figure 1 here  
 
This HRM approach is now nearly universally applied across organizations. However, 
given that it is not practiced in the selection of labour trustees it is important to note 
its weaknesses for that context. One weakness lies in the emphasis on functional 
and technical competence over any political or organizing skills. A formal job analysis 
of the pension trustee job could yield a job description that is devoid of the 
organizational needs of a union to develop its future leaders. Such a job description 
and the recruitment and selection that follows could be “technically” efficient in 
finding a suitable candidate, but it could be sub-optimal for the union in its own 
long-term planning for leadership succession. 
   
A second weakness is that a detailed job analysis would be quite onerous for each 
pension board, particularly given that most trustees are already pressured by time 
and are not compensated well by financial industry standards (Myners 2001; 
Weststar & Verma 2008, Ambachtsteer et al 2008). To further complicate matters, it 
could be argued that the skills or competencies required for labour trustees differ 
from requirements for non-labour trustees. For example, relevant past experience 
for labour trustees would include trade union experience as well as work or life 
experiences that do not directly relate to pension issues. Similarly competencies 
based on activist or alternative investment perspectives (i.e., investing in local 
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communities or unionized employers, using proxy voting to punish poor labour 
practices, or divesting in socially undesirable industries) might not be expected, 
required, or desired for all pension trustees. In practice, then, unions would conduct 
their own job analysis of the pension trustee role and arrive at different 
qualifications for trustees than the governments’ or employers’ qualifications. 
According to Quarter et al (2008: 7) this differentiation in roles is critical due to the 
persistent coercion or undermining of ‘lay’ trustees by the technocracy (such as fund 
managers) as the industry attempts to retain hegemony over investment practice 
and education. For instance, one Canadian fund manager commented: 
 
While many plans are managed professionally, their boards are 
sometimes stocked with persons whose principal merit is that they are 
members, who have been elected by their fellow employees. While this 
is laudably democratic, it does not always produce the quality of 
direction and oversight necessary in today’s bewildering world (Report 
of the Senate Standing Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce 
1998: 6). 
 
Labour trustees argue differently: 
 
We can learn the financial stuff- what labor trustees need to have 
is the strong union perspective/world view….There is no real sense 
of experts on pension funds – even people with a background in 
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the financial stuff (i.e. accounting etc.) will be lacking other skills 
essential to running a business (Interviewee T10). 
 
An over-emphasis on certain skills or competencies such as financial acumen in 
trusteeship may mean that other crucial aspects such as governance or the benefits 
aspect of trusteeship are not fully developed. In selecting among candidates it may 
be that the decision becomes more of a competition between the suitability of the 
candidate in relation to industry and union perspectives of professionalism than 
comparing them to what is actually required in the role. 
 
Discussion: An Integrated Approach for Labour Trustees 
 
As noted above, the political nomination and HRM approaches have unique strengths 
and weaknesses in the context of labour trustee recruitment and selection. As it is 
unlikely that all unions would completely forgo the political nomination method in 
favour of a full-blown HRM approach, in what follows we argue that a blended 
approach could add great value to the process. Already, unions such as the Ontario 
Public Sector Employees’ Union (OPSEU) have instituted a more detailed HRM 
approach to their appointment process for the OPTrust and OMERS pension boards.  
For example, the 2011 OPSEU Policy Pensions Manual states:  
 
• Advertisement and job description are circulated as widely as 
possible including the OPSEU website;  
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• Membership responses are submitted to the Membership 
Benefits Unit; Short list of candidates is prepared by the Pension 
Liaison Committee;  
• Short-listed candidates are interviewed by a three-person panel  
• Panel recommendations are forwarded to the OPSEU Executive 
Committee and Executive Board for review and approval;  
• Executive Board appoints Trustees based on assessment and 
recommendations…  
 
Job Analysis 
A challenge with the political nomination approach is the perception that labour 
representatives are just union lackeys or appointed for purely political reasons. Even 
a labour trustee comments: 
 
I feel that largely the union wants to pick rank and filers who will 
vote the way that they (the union) want and are not expecting 
much additional value added beyond that. (T9) 
 
Additionally, our data indicate that many labour trustees receive limited guidelines 
from their unions as to their role and have unclear expectations about their purpose 
on the board. The question of “what is the job of a labour trustee” may differ for 
different unions and different plans, but this can be accounted for in an 
individualized job analysis that assesses the required tasks and the knowledge, skills, 
and abilities required to carry out those tasks. As much as is required and desired, 
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this job analysis would include the tasks and skills required to fulfill any union or 
labour mandate. A resulting job description would surely differ depending on 
individual trade union perspectives towards pensions and pension involvement, the 
structural characteristics of the board and the plan, and board composition. For 
example, the skills and experience needed for a labour trustee might be different if 
they are the only labour representative at the table, if they are operating in a joint-
trusteeship model, if they are one union voice among many other unions, or one 
union voice among multiple employers.   
 
Job Description  
The job description and job advertisement explicitly state the expectations of the 
role as they stem from the job analysis. This acts as a signal to prospective 
applicants and serves as a guiding framework for performance in the job. As follows 
from the job analysis, any particular characteristics that are valued through the 
political nomination model could be codified here.  For example, a fundamental 
requirement for labour trustees is that they must be capable of recognising union 
policy and be able to reflect on this from the perspective of all pension plan 
members in order to avoid a conflict of interest. OPSEU’s (2011) job advertisement 
explicitly states that its labour trustees need an understanding of the union’s beliefs 
and policies as well as the ability to “articulate where workers sit in relation to the 
management and investment of capital”. Applicants also must be able to formulate a 
pension position from their reading of documentation and research, defend that 
positions to high status others, prepare position papers based on “Union 
foundations”, and be aware of the time commitments required.  
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A statement from a labour trustee and union official confirms many of these 
responsibilities and illustrates that social and technical competencies as well as 
structural features of the job (i.e., time commitments) could be identified and 
formalized in a written job description:  
 
the role requires a very active voice, it is time consuming, but you 
do not spend a lot of time negotiating as you delegate; but you 
have to know what to delegate and you have to be careful about 
monitoring the delegation and you have to be very careful about 
being socially responsible and ethical investments; and every so 
often you really have to bring in a manager, when things start 
going off the rails and stuff; it’s a very active role, it’s pretty tiring 
time-wise and energy-wise. (T27)  
 
Such a job description would more accurately portray the demands of the job so that 
potential applicants are prepared for the role and recognize its challenges. The 
amount of time the job demands is a real concern for labour trustees as the 
demands increase (Reference Withheld2008). As well, the job must have a clear and 
appropriate compensatory arrangement in order to attract and retain the best 
candidates. As noted by one trustee,  
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“I think it is very important that trustees are given time off with pay to 
travel, and prepare for the meetings. It should not cost an employee 
anything to sit as a trustee.” (Interviewee T8) 
 
 Most compensatory arrangements for labour trustees are inadequate because 
trustees are only reimbursed for the time spent at meetings. Also there is 
inconsistency in how trustees are reimbursed with some trustees reporting no 
compensation at all (Reference Withheld2008). It is recommended that the sponsors 
of pension plans seriously consider the different financial and temporal demands on 
their trustees and compensate these demands equitably across all trustee types 
(Ambachtsheer 2007).  Though equitable compensation systems can exist within a 
political nomination approach to recruitment and selection, a formal process that 
legitimizes successful union candidates would help to make the case for increased 
compensation for their contributions.  
 
Identifying Entry Qualifications 
Due to the debate over the knowledge, skills, abilities and/or competencies required 
for pension trustees and the centrality of these to the selection and evaluation 
process of HRM, it is necessary to expand our discussion at this point.   
 
Pension fund regulators in Canada do not stipulate the skills required of a pension 
trustee. As one senior pension administrator noted, a trustee needs to have “the skill 
to go out and get knowledge and expertise if required’” and s/he has to have 
enough knowledge to assess and monitor that expert knowledge. Within this context 
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there is a general recognition that for boards to function effectively their members 
need a wide range of skills. These would include specific expertise in law, finance 
and management as well as broader capability with respect to problem solving, 
facilitating decision-making, the maintenance of effective working relationships, 
communicating with the constituency and leadership bodies, working with a group, 
and a strong commitment to the role.  
 
In the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan the labour seats are outsourced to 
professional trustees selected from the financial industry. In this case, there is a 
clear preference for specific professional skills: “Since 1990, the OTF and the Ontario 
government have successfully attracted board members with the appropriate 
qualifications in investments, finance, accounting, law, actuarial science, business 
management and technology to properly oversee management’s decisions and 
actions.” (www.otpp.com) The implication of the focus on these skill sets is 
immediately apparent in reviewing the biographies; only one of the nine board 
members has direct experience as a union member and one other is arguably a 
progressive economist who has consulted for trade unions.  
  
In a blended political nomination and HRM approach the entry requirements would 
reflect a balance between the mix of experiences gained through specific training in 
or exposure to pension governance issues and more general skills typically acquired 
through union activity. It is not surprising that previous involvement in union 
activities plays a larger part in who gets nominated than expertise in pension 
matters. One labour trustee felt that if you are a union activist, ‘that puts you in the 
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pool so to speak’ (T11). Another told us that he was ‘concerned about (formal) 
evaluation and selection procedures because of the broad knowledge needed [in 
trusteeship].’ (T10) He explained that he did not know anything about pensions 
when he came to the role, but he had a lot of other skills and knowledge (such as 
leadership and union connections) that have made him a good trustee. If the 
selection criteria are too rigidly tied to domain-specific skills then these broader 
oversight skills could be discounted or go unnoticed.  
 
Within the context of a blended approach, a competency framework would be 
useful. Competencies are used to select people who share the beliefs that underpin 
an organisation’s culture. Given the complexity of the labour trustee role and the 
political context in which it resides, a competency approach would allow trade unions 
to incorporate into their selection criteria such broad factors as: traits, motives, self-
image, and one’s social role. It is true that the competency approach is more 
complicated and trade unions may not have the resources and inclination to draw up 
a meaningful range of competencies (Markus et al 2005; Heinsman et al, 2007). 
However, we consider in principle that a competency approach permits unions to 
include labour values and attitudes as well as specific functional skill-sets in trustee 
selection. Continuous learning and recognition of the integrity of the governance 
process could also be included here.  
 
Depending on the competencies or skills identified as required qualifications, we can 
begin to see a continuum of potential labour trustee applicants. On the left would be 
a political nomination approach which would tend to privilege previous union 
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experience. On the right would be a ‘professional’ skills approach that would 
privilege those with pension or financial experience. Two blended options exist. First, 
unions could employ an HRM approach that focuses on pension aptitude, but is 
applied within the ranks of union membership. This approach can sidestep the 
politics of the nomination model to some degree, but the specific requirement of 
pension aptitude likely narrows the pool of potential applicants to union staff or 
executive members who have served on pensions and benefits committees. Rank 
and file members with different experience would be discounted or self-select out of 
the pool. In practice what happens is: 
 
Labour trustees are normally recruited (by the union) and often include  
union staff members because they have more time to devote to the issues, 
more expertise generally in pensions and/or union matters, more consistency 
of the union message (Interviewee T9). 
 
Though grounding in a union perspective is a benefit for labour trustees, a pool of 
individuals already appointed or elected to official union roles may not provide ideal 
levels of diversity. Therefore, we would recommend a second HRM approach that 
highlights the need for some pension aptitude in conjunction with grounding in the 
union worldview and the commitment to learn. This latter approach is the model 
employed by OPSEU, who explicitly state a preference for plan members over union 
staff (OPSEU, 2011: 6). The preference for plan members also helps to reduce the 
distance between the membership and the labour representative and strengthens 
the pluralistic assumption upon which representative democracy is based.  
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Attracting Qualified Applicants 
In the HRM approach it is desirable to recruit as large an applicant pool as possible 
to widen choice in selecting the best job candidate. However, as is the case for most 
senior executive roles, the numbers of candidates for each pension trustee position 
are generally small. For labour trustees, the ultimate constraint is typically the 
requirement to be a member of the union and the pension scheme. Given the job 
complexity, there are a limited number of rank and file members who would meet 
the criteria. Therefore, it is somewhat unavoidable and perhaps desirable to employ 
political nomination techniques to identify and encourage potential applicants. 
However, the political nature of appointments needs to be acknowledged because it 
would be unlikely that the President/ Executive would support the candidature of 
someone with whom they fundamentally disagree. Using clear HRM selection 
techniques to assess and ultimately select the successful candidate can mitigate 
some of the political bias that might result from this system.  
 
Selection Techniques  
Unions have limited resources and for many the issue of pension governance is not a 
priority. The political nomination method (either appointment or election) is useful 
because it employs systems already in place within the union structure and does not 
add significant administrative burden. HRM selection approaches should aim to be as 
effective as possible while balancing simplicity, time and cost (see Schwind et al 
2007); however, even the simplest techniques such as application letters where 
individuals outline their motivation, experience and skills, written tests about 
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governance, or interviews to probe whether the candidates grasps the intricacies of 
the role will require additional bureaucracy for the union. Therefore, the priority for a 
blended approach should be to employ a transparent and fair process that values a 
range of skills and past experiences without discouraging applicants due to overly 
onerous or intimidating selection processes or the impression of jumping through 
hoops.   
 
Our data suggest that labour trustees face a very high demand on their time, a very 
steep learning curve, required to read considerable amounts of material at short 
notice, covert and overt disinclination of other board members to answer questions, 
and the general feeling of being on the outside of Board proceedings. These findings 
suggest that the process could benefit from some form of realistic job preview. Each 
applicant could easily have an informational meeting with current or outgoing 
trustees. A type of ‘trustee in training’ system could increase the pool of qualified 
applicants and permit interested individuals to attend pension training and engage in 
discussions with trustees, before they even apply for the job. This would form a pool 
of previously self-identified ‘trainees’ for recruitment and selection and also serve an 
important general education function. To help fulfill the political or representational 
mandate, this could also be a fertile ground for discussions and guidance about 
labour’s specific role in pension trusteeship.   
 
 Induction into the Job 
Unlike an HRM approach, in a political nomination model there is no explicit 
provision for job orientation or socialization. Labour trustees face a steep learning 
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curve and the potential for exclusion at the board table.  An HRM approach that 
encouraged unions to provide on-going training and access to wider support 
networks comprised of experts and other labour trustees could better prepare 
trustees for the upward battle of gaining legitimacy at the board and equip them 
with the necessary arguments for a stakeholder perspective of pension governance 
(Carmichael et al 2003). Existing examples of such support are the trustee education 
initiatives of the Fédération des travailleurs et travailleuses du Québec (FTQ) and the 
Shareholder Association for Research and Education (SHARE).  According to a labour 
trustee and pension specialist, the FTQ plays a crucial role in supporting lay trustees:  
 
 We do have pressure from others in Canada that [pension trustees] 
shouldn’t be union members they should be specialists, because the 
union members don’t have the knowledge or the time to do the job 
right. And we at FTQ are saying it is possible, we have been doing it 
for many years… We actually think our trustees are better than 
employer nominated trustees because they choose to be there. (T24)  
 
An HRM approach to job incumbency based on job performance and continuous 
learning also reflects the need to invest in the development of labour trustees and 
not force trustees from their role if only to comply with democratic principles of 
unionism that perhaps do not fit this unique role. 
  
 Summary of A Blended Model 
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 Based on the above discussions, we have attempted to dichotomize particular 
recruitment and selection behaviours into an HRM and political nomination approach 
(see Table 1). Our argument is that unions would do well to consider recruitment 
and selection from both approaches based on their own ideologies and realities for 
labour involvement in pension governance. This integration would overcome some of 
the key weaknesses of both the political nomination and human resources model. In 
sum, the HRM approach could bring more transparency and accountability to the 
recruitment and selection process. This fits with the ideals of pension governance. 
An HRM approach does not eliminate all political elements of the recruitment and 
selection process. Unions have to design their processes to specifically acknowledge 
that selection can be a “political exercise that involves different levels of influence 
and power between power networks of various collaborations, cliques and coalitions” 
and which act to favour candidates who will help advance the vested interests of 
these groups (Bozionelos 2005:1607). In this way, the HRM model adds legitimacy 
to labour trustees as they engage in a more competitive process that involves 
considerations of relevant skills or competencies.  
 
The importance of broad-based experiences rooted in the lives of working people, 
activism, and trade union activities are often discounted in formal credential-based 
systems (Livingstone & Sawchuk, 2004). The political nomination approach permits 
these traditional values to be considered and recognizes the power dynamics at work 
in the pension board context. Relationships between the executive members are 
more influential in the decision-making process than notions of comparative 
expertise. As a former trade union policy maker and pension expert notes: 
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Trustees need to recognise that a lot of the key decisions you end up 
making regardless of whether you’re in a so-called expert 
environment or a representative environment include making key 
value judgments [and] are not frankly matters of expertise. As you 
get to the point of a decision-making process on boards personal 
interactions becomes incredibly important to the decision making 
process and there is no expert financial aspect to these things. (T 
22) 
  
The executive nature of decision-making on pension boards is a core activity and 
skill, but this decision-making has a behavioural, political dimension that is linked to 
the power and status of the individuals involved and the organisational context in 
which it operates. Political behaviour is an important feature of trade union activities 
that influences organisational processes such as recruitment (Treadway et al 2005). 
Political savvy gained from years of union activism cannot be discounted. As such, 
the intention is for trade unions to first analyse the trustee role from an HRM 
perspective and then move to incorporate political aspects that are fundamental to 
them as an organisation.  
          
 Table 1 here         
 
Conclusion 
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This paper concludes that the recruitment process for labour trustees needs to 
acknowledge the political, regulatory and organisational contexts in which pension 
trustees operate in order to attract and retain talented individuals. It also needs to 
consider the emphasis that different trade unions place on pension governance and 
supporting labour trustees in performing their fiduciary duties. In this regard, neither 
the professional HRM approach nor the political nomination approach as it is 
currently practiced is likely to yield the best outcomes for unions and their members. 
A different approach that integrates some of the strengths of both approaches is 
more likely to help unions place effective trustees on pension boards. An integrated 
model of recruitment and selection would also need to acknowledge the dynamics of 
differing political imperatives of both private and public institutions, which can 
impact on the process by which labour trustees are selected/appointed/elected 
(Calvert 2005).  The model could also be extended to employer trustee 
representatives enhance selections. This would help address how some employer 
trustees are not picked for the skills they can bring to trusteeship but more because 
of the position they occupy within the sponsoring organization.  
 
Our analysis suggests that effective labour trustees need to be able to respond to 
the concerns of the labour community while simultaneously maintaining the fiduciary 
rigour required by law to protect the plan and its constituents. At the heart of these 
assertions is the need for labour bodies to be explicit about their strategic goals in 
pension governance. Without this focus on long-term goals, trade unions would be 
unable to articulate the role of the labour trustee (i.e., conduct job analysis) and 
unions would find it difficult to develop their own talent in this area. Unless better 
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recruitment and selection processes are put in place, effective labour voice in 
pension governance will remain elusive.  
 
The similarity of Anglo-Saxon pension trust frameworks and fiduciary responsibilities 
in North America, the UK and Australia (Clark 2007, Hess 2005, Kang et al 2007) 
indicates that the integrated model has relevance outside of the Canadian context. 
In recognizing the political context in which nomination occurs in public and private 
institutions and in strengthening recruitment and selection of appointed 
representatives in line with a HRM approach it can help improve the legitimacy of 
candidates who represent the membership as well as improve governance.  
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Table 1: Considerations for the Recruitment and Selection of Labour 
Trustees 
          
  HRM Model  Political 
Nomination 
Model  
Integrated Model 
Job analysis  • Outline the integrity of 
the governance process 
and the potential for 
conflict; 
• Consider compensation: 
temporal and financial 
aspects  
• Recognise what 
type of labour 
trustee is required 
for the pension 
plan model 
• Outline goals and 
expectations of 
labour trustees from 
a labour/trade union 
perspective 
Job 
description 
Person 
specification  
• Specific expertise 
needed (i.e., legal, 
financial, leadership, 
personal development, 
open-mindedness, 
communication, coalition 
maintenance, analytical 
skills)  
 
• Union experience 
and sensibility 
• Organising skills 
• Ability to articulate 
and defend skills 
and views to other 
executives and 
important others in 
boardroom context 
Attracting 
candidates 
• Publicise to the 
membership and invite 
independent applications 
• Personal 
identification of 
potential 
candidates from 
small pool by 
senior union 
members 
• Widen the candidate 
pool through: a 
trustee-in-training 
system, pension 
training, contact / 
mentoring with 
existing trustees  
Selecting 
Candidates 
• Validated tests and 
interviews to check 
candidates’ skills, 
motivation and 
commitment to 
trusteeship  
• Verify candidates’ 
ability to recognize 
labour perspective  
• Outline a wide 
range of required 
skills & experiences   
• Use a transparent 
and fair assessment 
process without 
being overly 
complicated 
Making the 
appointment 
• Match candidate to job 
specification  
• Complement existing 
composition of pension 
board skills 
• Match prevailing 
labour values and 
attitudes with the 
candidate  
• Balance the need 
for both specific and 
broad skills with 
union activism and 
the collective 
pension board 
constituency  
Induction  • Outline fiduciary / 
regulatory requirements 
• Offer training regarding 
planning, governance, 
finance and welfare as 
well as the pension plan 
context 
• Support /offer 
training with a 
strategic/political 
labour perspective  
• Build networks 
with other labour 
trustees 
• Consider diversity of 
pension education 
as well as available 
social networks in 
supporting trustee 
development 
  
